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Abstract. We investigate quantum authentication schemes constructed from quantum error-correcting
codes. We show that if the code has a property called purity testing, then the resulting authentication
scheme guarantees the integrity of ciphertexts, not just plaintexts. On top of that, if the code is strong
purity testing, the authentication scheme also allows the encryption key to be recycled, partially even if
the authentication rejects. Such a strong notion of authentication is useful in a setting where multiple
ciphertexts can be present simultaneously, such as in interactive or delegated quantum computation.
With these settings in mind, we give an explicit code (based on the trap code) that is strong purity
testing but, contrary to other known strong-purity-testing codes, allows for natural computation on
ciphertexts.
1 Introduction
A central topic in cryptography is authentication: how can we make sure that a message remains
unaltered when we send it over an insecure channel? How do we protect a file from being corrupted
when it is stored someplace where adversarial parties can potentially access it? And, especially
relevant in the current era of cloud computing, how can we let an untrusted third party compute
on such authenticated data?
Following extensive research on authentication of classical data, starting with the seminal work
by Wegman and Carter [WC81], several schemes have been proposed for authenticating quantum
states [BCG+02, ABE08, BGS13]. One notable such scheme is the trap code [BGS13], an encoding
scheme that surrounds the data with dummy qubits that function as traps, revealing any unautho-
rized attempts to alter the plaintext data. A client holding the classical encryption key can guide
a third party in performing computations directly on the ciphertext by sending input-independent
auxiliary quantum states that help bypass the traps, and updating the classical key during the
computation. The result is an authenticated output ciphertext.
The trap code distinguishes itself from other quantum authentication schemes in two ways.
First, individually-authenticated input qubits can be entangled during the computation, but still
be de-authenticated individually. This contrasts for example the Clifford code [ABE08], where de-
authentication needs to happen simultaneously on all qubits that were involved in the computation,
including any auxiliary ones. Second, the trap code allows for ‘authenticated measurements’: if a
third party measures a ciphertext, the client can verify the authenticity of the result from the classi-
cal measurement outcomes only. These two qualities make the trap code uniquely suited for quantum
computing on authenticated data. It was originally designed for its use in quantum one-time pro-
grams [BGS13], but has found further applications in zero-knowledge proofs for QMA [BJSW16],
and in quantum homomorphic encryption with verification [ADSS17].
The extraordinary structure of the trap code is simultaneously its weakness: an adversary can
learn information about the secret key by altering the ciphertext in a specific way, and observing
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whether or not the result is accepted by the client. Thus, to ensure security after de-authentication,
the key needs to be refreshed before another quantum state is authenticated. This need for a refresh
inhibits the usefulness of the trap code, because computation on multiple qubits under the trap
code requires these qubits to be authenticated under overlapping secret keys.
In recent years, several works have refined the original definition of quantum authentication by
Barnum et al. [BCG+02]. The trap code is secure under the weakest of these definitions [DNS12],
where only authenticity of the plaintext is guaranteed. But, as argued, it is not under the stronger
‘total authentication’ [GYZ17], where no information about the key is leaked if the client accepts
the authentication. As Portmann mentions in his work on authentication with key recycling in
the abstract-cryptography framework [Por17], it is not even clear whether the trap code can be
regarded as a scheme with partial key leakage, as defined in [GYZ17], because of the adaptive way in
which it can be attacked. In a different direction, Alagic, Gagliardoni, and Majenz [AGM17] define
a notion of quantum ciphertext authentication (QCA), where also the integrity of the ciphertext is
guaranteed, and not just that of the plaintext. Ciphertext authentication is incomparable with total
authentication: neither one implies the other. Before the current work, it was unknown whether the
trap code authenticates ciphertexts.
Barnum et al. [BCG+02] built schemes for authentication of quantum data based on quantum
error-correcting codes that are purity testing, meaning that any bit or phase flip on the message is
detected with high probability. Portmann [Por17], working in the abstract-cryptography framework,
showed that if the underlying code satisfies a stronger requirement called strong purity testing, the
resulting authentication scheme allows for complete key recycling in the accept case, and for partial
key recycling in the reject case. The trap code can be seen as a purity-testing error-correcting code,
but it is not strong purity testing. This is consistent with the observation that keys in the trap
code cannot be recycled.
Quantum plaintext authentication with key recycling has been studied before. Oppenheim and
Horodecki [OH05] showed partial key recycling for schemes based on purity testing codes, under
a weaker notion of security. Hayden, Leung, and Mayers [HLM16] adapted Barnum et al.’s con-
struction to use less key and show its authenticating properties in the universal-composability
framework. Fehr and Salvail [FS17] develop a quantum authentication scheme for classical mes-
sages that achieves the same key-recycling rate as Portmann [Por17], but is not based on quantum
error-correction and only requires the client to prepare and measure.
1.1 Our contributions
We investigate the relation between (strong) purity testing and quantum ciphertext authentication
(QCA), and give a variation on the trap code with stronger security guarantees. We specify our
contributions in more detail below.
Section 3: Definition of quantum ciphertext authentication with key recycling (QCA-R). We give a
new definition for quantum authentication, QCA-R, that provides both ciphertext authentication
and key recycling, and is thereby strictly stronger than existing definitions. See Figure 1 for a
comparison of different notions of authentication.
Section 3.1: Purity-testing codes give rise to QCA-secure encryption. We prove that Barnum et al.’s
canonical construction of authentication schemes from purity-testing codes [BCG+02] produces
schemes that are not only plaintext authenticating, but also ciphertext authenticating (QCA).
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Fig. 1. Overview of different definitions of quantum authentication. Three previously defined notions (in gray) and
their relations were already known: DNS [DNS12] is strictly weaker than GYZ [GYZ17] (total authentication) and
QCA [AGM17]. These last two are incomparable: there exist schemes that satisfy either one, but not the other. On
the bottom right, our new definition QCA-R is displayed: it is strictly stronger than both GYZ and QCA.
The proof generalizes the proofs in [BW16] that the trap code and Clifford code are plaintext
authenticating, using a different (but still efficient) simulator. Note that our result immediately
implies that the trap code is ciphertext authenticating.
Section 3.1: Strong-purity-testing codes give rise to QCA-R-secure encryption. Purity-testing codes
are generally not sufficient for constructing QCA-R schemes, but strong-purity-testing codes are:
we prove that Barnum et al.’s canonical construction achieves QCA-R when a strong-purity-testing
code is used as a resource. In case the authenticated message is accepted, the entire key can be
reused. Otherwise, all but the quantum-one-time-pad key can be reused.
Section 4: A strong-purity-testing version of the trap code. We give an explicit construction of a
strong-purity-testing code that is inspired by the trap code. In this strong trap code, the underlying
error-correcting code is not only applied to the data qubits, but also to the trap qubits. The result
is a quantum authentication scheme which satisfies the strong notion of QCA-R, but still maintains
the computational properties that make the original trap code such a useful scheme.
Section 5: Security under parallel encryption. To illustrate the power of recycling key in the reject
case, we consider a setting with a different type of key reuse: reusing (part of) a key immediately to
authenticate a second qubit, even before the first qubit is verified. We show that, if multiple qubits
are simultaneously authenticated using a scheme that is based on a strong-purity-testing code, then
de-authenticating some of these qubits does not jeopardize the security of the others, even if their
keys overlap. This property is especially important when using the computational capabilities of the
strong trap code, since computing on authenticated qubits needs multiple qubits to use overlapping
keys.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We use conventional notation for unitary matrices (U or V ), pure states (|ψ〉 or |ϕ〉), and mixed
states (ρ or σ). We reserve the symbol τ for the completely mixed state I/d, and |Φ+〉 for the EPR
pair 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). The m-qubit Pauli group is denoted with Pm, and its elements with P` where
` is a 2m-bit string indicating the bit-flip and phase-flip positions. By convention, P0 is identity.
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We often specify the register(s) on which a unitary acts by gray superscripts (as in UR); it is
implicit that the unitary acts as identity on all other registers. The trace norm of a density matrix
ρ is written as ‖ρ‖tr. The diamond norm of a channel Ψ is written as ‖Ψ‖ := supρ‖(I⊗Ψ)(ρ)‖tr. If
we want to talk about the distance between two channels Ψ and Ψ′, we use the normalized quantity
1
2‖Ψ−Ψ′‖, which we refer to as the diamond-norm distance.
2.2 Quantum authentication
A secret-key quantum encryption scheme consists of three (efficient) algorithms: key generation
KeyGen, encryption Encryptk, and decryption Decryptk. Throughout this work, we will assume that
KeyGen selects a key k uniformly at random from some set K; our results still hold if the key is
selected according to some other distribution. By Lemma B.9 in [AM17], we can characterize the
encryption and decryption maps as being of the form
Encryptk : ρ
M 7→ UMTk (ρ⊗ σTk )(U †k)MT , (1)
Decryptk : ρ
MT 7→ TrT
[
(Πacck )
T
(
U †kρU
MT
k
)
(Πacck )
T
]
+DMTk
[
(Πrejk )
T
(
U †kρU
MT
k
)
(Πrejk )
T
]
. (2)
Here, M is the message register, σk is some key-dependent tag state in register T , and Uk is a unitary
acting on both. Πacck and Π
rej
k are orthogonal projectors onto the support of σk and its complement,
respectively. Finally, Dk is any channel: we will usually assume that Dk(·) = TrMT (·)⊗|⊥〉〈⊥|M , i.e.,
it traces out the message and tag register entirely, and replaces the message with some dummy state
that signifies a reject. Because of the above characterization, we will often talk about encryption
schemes as a keyed collection {(Uk, σk)}k∈K of unitaries and tag states.
There are several definitions of the authentication of quantum data. All definitions involve
some parameter ε; unless otherwise specified, we require ε to be negligibly small in the size of the
ciphertext.
The simplest definition is that of plaintext authentication, presented in [DNS12] (although
their definition was in phrased terms of the trace norm), where no guarantees are given about the
recyclability of the key.
Definition 1 (Quantum plaintext authentication (DNS) [DNS12]). A quantum encryption
scheme {(Uk, σk)}k∈K is plaintext ε-authenticating (or ε-DNS) if for all CP maps A (acting on the
message register M , tag register T , and a side-information register R), there exist CP maps Sacc
and Srej such that S := Sacc + Srej is trace-preserving, and
1
2
∥∥∥∥E
k
[
Decryptk ◦ AMTR ◦ Encryptk
]MR − (IM ⊗ SRacc + |⊥〉〈⊥|M (TrM ⊗ SRrej))∥∥∥∥

≤ ε,
where Encryptk and Decryptk are of the form of equations (1) and (2).
The simulator in Definition 1 reflects the ideal functionality of an authentication scheme: in the
accept case, the message remains untouched, whereas in the reject case, it is completely discarded
and replaced with the fixed state |⊥〉〈⊥|. Any action on the side-information register R is allowed.
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The trap code. An example of a plaintext-authenticating scheme is the trap code [BGS13]. This
scheme encrypts single-qubit messages by applying a fixed distance-d CSS code E to the message,
producing n physical qubits, and then appending 2n “trap” qubits (n computational-basis traps
in the state |0〉〈0|, and n Hadamard-basis traps in the state |+〉〈+|). The resulting 3n qubits are
permuted in a random fashion according to a key k1, and one-time padded with a second key k2.
At decryption, the one-time pad and permutation are removed, the traps are measured in their re-
spective bases, and the syndrome of the CSS code is checked.3 The trap code, for a key k = (k1, k2),
is characterized by Uk = Pk2pik1(E ⊗ I⊗n ⊗ H⊗n) and σk = |0〉〈0|⊗(3n−1), where pik1 is a unitary
that permutes the 3n qubits. A proof that the trap code is plaintext (2/3)
d/2-authenticating can be
found in e.g. [BW16].
Another definition of quantum authentication is presented in [GYZ17] (where it is called ‘total
authentication’): in this definition, the key should be recyclable in the accept case. This is modeled
by revealing the key to the environment after use, and requiring that it is indistinguishable from a
completely fresh and uncorrelated key. If that is the case, it can be recycled for another round.
Definition 2 (Quantum plaintext authentication with key recycling (GYZ) [GYZ17]). A
quantum encryption scheme {(Uk, σk)}k∈K is plaintext ε-authenticating with key recycling (or ε-
GYZ) if for all CP maps A (acting on the message register M , tag register T , and a side-information
register R), there exist CP maps Sacc and Srej such that S := Sacc + Srej is trace preserving, and
1
2
∥∥∥∥E
k
[
ρMR 7→ TrT
(
Πacck U
†
k
(
AMTR
(
Uk(ρ⊗ σTk )U †k
))
UkΠ
acc
k
)
⊗ |k〉〈k|
]
− (IM ⊗ SRacc ⊗ τK)∥∥∥∥

≤ ε.
Note that Definition 2 only specifies what should happen in the accept case. Nevertheless, it is a
strictly stronger definition than DNS authentication [AM17].
The trap code is not plaintext ε-authenticating with key recycling for sub-constant ε. To see
this, consider an adversary A that applies X to (only) the first qubit of the MT register. With
probability 2/3, the attack lands on a data qubit or a |0〉〈0| trap, and is detected. Thus, in the real
accept scenario, the key register will contain a mixture of only those keys that permute a |+〉〈+|
into the first position. All other keys are diminished by the projector Πacck . Since the ideal scenario
contains a mixture of all possible keys in the key register, the difference between the two channels
is considerable. In practice, if an adversary learns whether the authentication succeeded, she gets
information about the positions of the traps.
The Clifford code. A simple yet powerful code that authenticates plaintexts with key recycling is
the Clifford code [ABE08]. In this code, we fix a parameter t, and set σk = |0t〉〈0t| for all k, and Uk
a uniformly random Clifford on t+ 1 qubits. The Clifford code (and any authentication code that
is based on a 2-design) is plaintext ε-authenticating with key recycling for ε = O(2−t) [AM17].
Strengthening Definition 1 in a different direction, Alagic, Gagliardoni, and Majenz recently
introduced the notion of quantum ciphertext authentication [AGM17]. This notion does not limit
the amount of key leaked, but requires that if authentication accepts, the entire ciphertext was
completely untouched.
3 We differ from the analysis by Broadbent and Wainewright [BW16] in that we consider the variant that uses error
detection instead of error correction on the data qubits.
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Definition 3 (Quantum ciphertext authentication (QCA) [AGM17]). A quantum encryp-
tion scheme {(Uk, σk =
∑
r pk,r|ϕk,r〉〈ϕk,r|)}k∈K is ciphertext ε-authenticating (or ε-QCA) if it is
plaintext ε-authenticating as in Definition 1, and the accepting simulator Sacc is of the form
Sacc : ρR 7→ E
k′,r
[
〈ϕk′,r|T 〈Φ+|M1M2U †k′AM1TR
(
UM1Tk′ ρ
RM1M2T
k′,r U
†
k′
)
Uk′ |ϕk′,r〉|Φ+〉
]
.
where ρk′,r := ρ
R ⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|M1M2⊗|ϕk′,r〉〈ϕk′,r|T is the input state before (simulated) encryption.
In QCA, the accepting simulator tests whether the message remains completely untouched by en-
crypting half of an EPR pair (stored in register M1) as a ‘dummy message’, under a key k
′ that it
generates itself. It remembers the randomness r used in creating the tag state σk, so that it can test
very accurately whether the tag state was untouched. Because Sacc remembers the randomness, a
scheme that appends a qubit at the end of its ciphertexts, but never checks its state at decryption
time, cannot be ciphertext authenticating. The Clifford code is QCA [AGM17], as is the trap code
(see Section 3.1).
In general, key recycling as in Definition 2 does not imply QCA. To see this, take any scheme
{(Uk, σk)}k∈K that is plaintext authenticating with key recycling, and alter it by appending a qubit
in the fully mixed state to σk (and extending Uk to act as identity on this qubit). This scheme still
satisfies Definition 2, but cannot be ciphertext authenticating, because attacks on this last qubit
are not noticed in the real scenario. Conversely, not all ciphertext-authenticating schemes have key
recycling. Take any scheme that is QCA, and alter it by adding one extra bit b of key, and setting
σkb := σk⊗|b〉〈b| and Ukb := Uk⊗ I, effectively appending the bit of key at the end of the ciphertext.
This scheme still satisfies Definition 3, but leaks at least one bit of key.4 For an overview of the
relations between DNS, GYZ, and QCA, refer to Figure 1 on page 3.
2.3 (Strong) purity testing in quantum error correction
An [[n,m]] quantum error-correcting code (QECC), characterized by a unitary operator V , encodes
a message ρ consisting of m qubits into a codeword V (ρ ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|)V † consisting of n qubits, by
appending t := n −m tags |0〉〈0|, and applying the unitary V . Decoding happens by undoing the
unitary V , and measuring the tag register in the computational basis. The measurement outcome
is called the syndrome: an all-zero syndrome indicates that no error-correction is necessary. In this
work, we will only use the error-detection property of QECCs, and will not worry about how to
correct the message if a non-zero syndrome is measured. If that happens, we will simply discard
the message (i.e., reject).
For any bit string x ∈ {0, 1}m, let |xL〉 (for “logical |x〉”) denote a valid encoding of |x〉, i.e.,
a state that will decode to |x〉 without error. A defining feature of any QECC is its distance: the
amount of bit and/or phase flips required to turn one valid codeword into another. If we want to
be explicit about the distance d of an [[n,m]] code, we will refer to it as an [[n,m, d]] code.
Definition 4 (Distance). The distance of an [[n,m]] code is the minimum weight of a Pauli P
such that P |xL〉 = |yL〉 for some x 6= y, with x, y ∈ {0, 1}m.
4 We thank Gorjan Alagic and Christian Majenz for providing these example schemes that show the separation
between Definitions 2 and 3.
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In a cryptographic setting, it can be useful to select a code from a set of codes {Vk}k∈K for some
key set K. We will again assume that the key k is selected uniformly at random.
Following [BCG+02] and [Por17], we restrict our attention to codes for which applying a Pauli
to a codeword is equivalent to applying a (possibly different) Pauli directly to the message and
tag register. In other words, the unitary V must be such that for any P` ∈ Pm+t, there exists a
P`′ ∈ Pm+t and a θ ∈ R such that P`V = eiθV P`′ . With our attention restricted to codes with this
property, we can meaningfully define the following property:
Definition 5 (Purity testing [BCG+02]). A set of codes {Vk}k∈K is purity testing with error
ε if for any Pauli P` ∈ Pm+t\{I⊗(m+t)},
Pr
k
[
V †k P`Vk ∈ (Pm\{I⊗m})⊗ {I,Z}⊗t
]
≤ ε.
In words, for any non-identity Pauli, the probability (over the key) that the Pauli alters the message
but is not detected (i.e., no tag bit is flipped) is upper bounded by ε.
The trap code (see page 5) based on an [[n, 1, d]] CSS code, without the final quantum one-
time pad, is a purity-testing code with error (2/3)
d/2 [BGS13]. In our framework, the trap code is
described as a QECC with m = 1, t = 3n− 1, and Vk = pik(E ⊗ I⊗n ⊗ H⊗n).
Note that purity-testing codes do not necessarily detect all Pauli attacks with high probability:
it may well be that a Pauli attack remains undetected, because it acts as identity on the message.
Flipping the first bit of a trap-code ciphertext is an example of such an attack: it remains undetected
with probability 1/3 (if it hits a |+〉 trap), but unless it is detected, it also does not alter the message.
An attacker may use this fact to learn information about the permutation pik by observing whether
or not the QECC detects an error.
The above exploitation of purity-testing codes has led Portmann to consider a stronger notion
of purity testing that should allow for keys to be safely reusable. In this definition, even the Paulis
that act as identity on the message should be detected:
Definition 6 (Strong purity testing [Por17]). A set of codes {Vk}k∈K is strong purity testing
with error ε if for any Pauli P` ∈ Pm+t\{I⊗(m+t)},
Pr
k
[
V †k P`Vk ∈ Pm ⊗ {I,Z}⊗t
]
≤ ε.
The Clifford code is strong purity testing with error 2−t, as is any other unitary 2-design [Por17].
As informally discussed above, the trap code is not strong purity testing for any small ε.
Barnum et al. [BCG+02] described a canonical method of turning a QECC set {Vk1}k1∈K1 into
a symmetric-key encryption scheme. The encryption key k consists of two parts: the key k1 ∈ K1
for the QECC, and an additional one-time pad key k2 ∈ {0, 1}2(m+t). The encryption map is then
defined by setting Uk1,k2 := Pk2Vk1 , and σk1,k2 = |0t〉〈0t|. Since σk1,k2 is key-independent, the
projectors Πacc = |0t〉〈0t| and Πrej = I − |0t〉〈0t| are key-independent as well. In Construction 1,
the complete protocol is described. In [BGS13], protocols of this form are called “encode-encrypt
schemes”.
When using Construction 1 with a strong-purity-testing code, plaintext authentication with key
recycling is achieved, even with partial key recycling in the reject case [Por17]. If just a purity-
testing code is used for the construction, the resulting encryption scheme is plaintext authenticat-
ing [BCG+02], but not necessarily with key recycling (the trap code is a counterexample).
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Construction 1. Barnum et al.’s canonical construction [BCG+02] of a symmetric-key encryption
scheme from an [[m+ t,m]] quantum error-correcting code {Vk1}k1∈K1 .
Key generation: Sample k1 ← K1. Sample k2 ← K2 = {0, 1}2(m+t).
Encryption: ρM 7→ PMTk2 VMTk1 (ρM ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|T )VMTk1 PMTk2 .
Decryption: ρMT 7→ 〈0t|
(
V †k1P
†
k2
ρPk2Vk1
)
|0t〉 + |⊥〉〈⊥|M⊗TrM
[∑
i6=0t
〈i|
(
V †k1P
†
k2
ρPk2Vk1
)
|i〉
]
3 Quantum ciphertext authentication with key recycling (QCA-R)
In this section, we will define a notion of quantum authentication that is stronger than all of
Definitions 1, 2, and 3. We will show that Construction 1, when used with a strong-purity-testing
code, results in an authentication scheme in this new, stronger sense.
Definition 7 (Quantum ciphertext authentication with key recycling (QCA-R)). A quan-
tum encryption scheme {(Uk, σk =
∑
r pk,r|ϕk,r〉〈ϕk,r|)}k∈K is ciphertext ε-authenticating with key
recycling (or ε-QCA-R), with key recycling function f , if for all CP maps A (acting on the message
register M , tag register T , and a side-information register R), there exists a CP map Srej such that
R : ρMR 7→ Ek
[
TrT
(
Πacc
(
U †kAMTR
(
UMTk (ρ⊗ σTk )U †k
)
Uk
)
Πacc
)
⊗ |k〉〈k|
+ |⊥〉〈⊥|M⊗ TrMT
(
Πrej
(
U †kAMTR
(
UMTk (ρ⊗ σTk )U †k
)
Uk
)
Πrej
)
⊗ |f(k)〉〈f(k)|
]
is ε-close in diamond-norm distance to the ideal channel,
I : ρMR 7→ (IM ⊗ Sacc) (ρMR)⊗ τK + |⊥〉〈⊥|M⊗ Srej(ρR)⊗ Ek [|f(k)〉〈f(k)|] ,
where S := Sacc + Srej is trace preserving, and Sacc is as in Definition 3 of QCA, that is,
Sacc : ρR 7→ E
k′,r
[
〈ϕk′,r|T 〈Φ+|M1M2U †k′AM1TR
(
UM1Tk′ ρ
RM1M2T
k′,r U
†
k′
)
Uk′ |ϕk′,r〉|Φ+〉
]
for ρk′,r := ρ
R ⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|M1M2⊗|ϕk′,r〉〈ϕk′,r|T .
The first condition (closeness of the real and ideal channel) is a strengthening of Definition 2:
following Portmann [Por17], we also consider which part of the key can be recycled in the reject
case. If the recycling function f is the identity function, all of the key can be recycled. If f maps
all keys to the empty string, then no constraints are put on key leakage in the reject case.
QCA-R strengthens both GYZ and QCA, but not vice versa: the schemes from Section 2.2 that
separate the two older notions are immediately examples of schemes that are GYZ or QCA but
cannot be QCA-R.
3.1 Constructing QCA-R from any strong-purity-testing code
It was already observed that if a set of quantum error-correcting codes {Vk1}k1∈K1 is purity testing,
then the encryption scheme resulting from Construction 1 is plaintext authenticating [BCG+02].
We strengthen this result by showing that the construction turns purity-testing codes into ci-
phertext-authenticating schemes (Theorem 8), and strong-purity-testing codes into QCA-R schemes
(Theorem 9). Only purity testing is in general not enough to achieve QCA-R: the trap code is again
a counterexample.
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Theorem 8. Let {Vk1}k1∈K1 be a purity-testing code with error ε. The encryption scheme resulting
from Construction 1 is quantum ciphertext ε-authenticating (ε-QCA).
Proof (Sketch). In order to prove Theorem 8, we define a simulator that runs the adversary on
encrypted halves of EPR pairs, so that the simulator is of the correct form for Definition 3. We
prove that the ideal and the real channel are close by considering the accept and the reject cases
separately, and by showing that they are both ε/2-close. First, we decompose the adversarial at-
tack into Paulis by Pauli twirling [DCEL09] it with the quantum-one-time-pad encryption from
Construction 1. In the accept case, the difference between the real and the ideal scenario lies in
those attacks that are accepted in the real case, but not in the ideal case. These are exactly those
Paulis that, after conjugation with the key k1 that indexes the purity-testing code, are in the set
(Pm⊗{I,Z}⊗t)\({I⊗m}⊗{I,Z}⊗t) = (Pm\{I⊗m})⊗{I,Z}⊗t. The purity-testing property guarantees
that the probability over k1 of a Pauli attack landing in this set is small. The reject case is similar.
uunionsq
A full proof of Theorem 8 is in Appendix A. The proof of Theorem 9 below uses the same
techniques. It follows the proof structure of [Por17, Theorem 3.5], but with a simulator that is
suitable for QCA-R.
Theorem 9. Let {Vk1}k1∈K1 be a strong-purity-testing code with error ε. The encryption scheme
resulting from Construction 1 is quantum ciphertext (
√
ε + 32ε)-authenticating with key recycling
(ε-QCA-R), with recycling function f(k1, k2) := k1.
Proof. Let A be an adversary as in Definition 7. Define a simulator S on the side-information
register R as follows: prepare an EPR pair |Φ+〉〈Φ+| in the register M1M2 and encrypt the first
qubit using a freshly sampled key (k′1, k
′
2) ∈ K := K1×K2 (that is, initialize the tag register T in the
state |0t〉〈0t|, and apply Pk′2Vk′1 to M1T ). Then, run the adversary on the registers M1TR, keeping
M2 to the side. Afterwards, run the decryption procedure by undoing the encryption unitary and
measuring whether the registers M1M2T are still in the state |Φ+, 0t〉〈Φ+, 0t| (= |Φ+〉〈Φ+|⊗|0t〉〈0t|).
If so, accept, and if not, reject. Note that this simulator is of the required form in the accept case
(see Definition 7).
We show that for this simulator, the distance 12‖I−R‖ between the ideal and the real channel
is upper bounded by
√
ε + 32ε. Let ρ
MRE be any quantum state on the message register, side-
information register, and an environment register E. Let UMTR be a unitary5 map representing the
adversarial channel A, and let µrealk1,k2 and µidealk1,k2 be the effective output states in the real and ideal
world, respectively:
µrealk1,k2 := V
†
k1
P †k2U
MTRPMTk2 V
MT
k1
(ρ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|)V †k1P
†
k2
U †Pk2Vk1 , (3)
µidealk1,k2 := V
†
k1
P †k2U
M1TRPM1Tk2 V
M1T
k1
(ρ⊗ |0t,Φ+〉〈0t,Φ+|)V †k1P
†
k2
U †Pk2Vk1 . (4)
5 We can assume unitarity without loss of generality: if the adversary’s actions are not unitary, we can dilate
the channel into a unitary one by adding another environment and tracing it out afterwards. In the proof, the
environment takes on the same role as the side-information register R, so we omit it for simplicity.
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Then we can write the result of the real and the ideal channels as
R(ρ) = E
k1,k2
〈0t|Tµrealk1,k2 |0t〉 ⊗ |k1k2〉〈k1k2| + |⊥〉〈⊥|M⊗ TrM
∑
i 6=0t
〈i|Tµrealk1,k2 |i〉
⊗ |k1〉〈k1|
 , (5)
I(ρ) = E
k′1,k
′
2
〈Φ+, 0t|M1M2Tµidealk′1,k′2 |Φ+0t〉 ⊗ τK + |⊥〉〈⊥|M⊗ TrM
 ∑
i6=(Φ+,0t)
〈i|M1M2Tµidealk′1,k′2 |i〉
⊗ τK1
 .
(6)
These expressions are obtained simply by plugging in the description of the authentication scheme
(see Construction 1) and the simulator into the channels of Definition 7. Since the accept states
are orthogonal to the reject states in the M register, and since the key states are all mutually
orthogonal, the distance 12‖I(ρ)−R(ρ)‖tr can be written as
E
k1,k2
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
(
〈Φ+, 0t|µidealk′1,k′2 |Φ
+, 0t〉
)
− 〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
+ E
k1
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
TrM ∑
i 6=(0t,Φ+)
〈i|µidealk′1,k′2 |i〉
−E
k2
TrM ∑
i 6=0t
〈i|µrealk1,k2 |i〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
. (7)
For a full derivation, see Appendix B.1. We can thus focus on bounding the two terms in
equation (7), for accept and reject, separately. Note the difference between the two terms: in the
reject case, the expectation over the one-time pad key k2 does not have to be brought outside of
the trace norm, since it is not recycled after a reject. This will make bounding the second term in
equation (7) the simpler of the two, so we will start with that one.
Decompose the attack as UMTR =
∑
` α`P
MT
` ⊗UR` . Intuitively, the two states inside the second
trace norm differ on those Paulis P` that are rejected in the ideal scenario, but not in the real one.
The strong-purity-testing property promises that these Paulis are very few. However, we have to
be careful, because the simulator independently generates its own set of keys. We will now bound
the second term in equation (7) more formally.
By rearranging sums, commuting Paulis, and applying projectors (for details: see Appendix B.2),
we can rewrite the second term inside the trace norm, the state in the real reject case for k1, as
E
k2
TrM ∑
i 6=0t
〈i|µrealk1,k2 |i〉
 = TrM
 ∑
` : V †k1P`Vk1 6∈Preal
|α`|2 UR` ρMRU †`
 , (8)
where Preal contains the Paulis that are accepted by the real projector, i.e., Preal := Pm ⊗ {I,Z}⊗t.
Similarly, defining Pideal := {I⊗m} ⊗ {I,Z}⊗t to be the set of Paulis that are allowed by the ideal
projector, the resulting state in the reject case is
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E
k′1,k
′
2
TrM ∑
i6=(0t,Φ+)
〈i|µidealk′1,k′2 |i〉
 = TrM

∑
` 6=0
E
k′1∈K1
V †
k′1
P`Vk′1
6∈Pideal
|α`|2 UR` ρMRU †`
 (9)
≈ε TrM
∑
6`=0
E
k′1∈K1
|α`|2 UR` ρMRU †`
 , (10)
where the approximation sign means that the trace distance between the two states is upper
bounded by ε. The closeness follows from the strong-purity-testing property of the code: the two
states differ in those keys k′1 for which V
†
k′1
P`Vk′1 ∈ Pideal ⊆ Preal, and for any non-identity Pauli
P`, this set is small by strong purity testing. Combined with the facts that tr(U`ρU
†
` ) = 1 and∑
` |α`|2 = 1, it follows that the states in equations (9) and (10) are ε-close. Note that none of the
terms in equation (10) depends on k′1, so we can remove the expectation over it.
Applying the triangle inequality (twice), the second term in equation (7) is found to be small:
E
k1
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
TrM ∑
i6=(0t,Φ+)
〈i|µidealk′1,k′2 |i〉
−E
k2
TrM ∑
i6=0t
〈i|µrealk1,k2 |i〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
(11)
≤ ε
2
+E
k1
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥TrM
 ∑
` : V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal\{I
⊗(m+t)}
|α`|2 U`ρU †`

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
(12)
≤ ε
2
+
1
2Ek1
∑
` : V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal\{I
⊗(m+t)}
|α`|2 , (13)
which we can upper bound by ε by applying the strong-purity-testing property once more.
Next, we bound the first term of equation (7): the difference between the ideal and the real
channel in the accept case. The strategy is identical to the reject case that we just treated, but
because we want to recycle both k1 and k2 in the accept case, we have to be more careful. The state
in the real scenario, 〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉, cannot be rewritten into the compact form of, e.g., equation (8),
because we cannot average over the Pauli key k2. Using a technical lemma from [Por17] and Jensen’s
inequality in order to take the expectation over the keys inside, we obtain the bound
E
k1,k2
∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
(
〈Φ+, 0t|µidealk′1,k′2 |Φ
+, 0t〉
)
− 〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ ε
2
+
√
ε. (14)
For a full derivation, see Appendix B.3.
We have now upper bounded 12‖I(ρ) − R(ρ)‖tr ≤
√
ε + 32ε for any state ρ
MRE , resulting in
1
2‖I−R‖≤
√
ε+ 32ε, as desired. uunionsq
4 A strong-purity-testing variation on the trap code
Theorem 9 already gives us a quantum-ciphertext-authenticating code with key recycling: the Clif-
ford code. However, the Clifford code is not very well suited for quantum computing on authenti-
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cated data. In this section, we therefore present a strong-purity-testing variation on the trap code,
the strong trap code, which does allow for computation on the ciphertexts in a meaningful and
efficient way. By Theorem 9, this construction immediately gives rise to a ciphertext authentication
scheme with key recycling (QCA-R). Note that the strong trap code is also secure in Portmann’s
abstract-cryptography definition of quantum plaintext authentication with key recycling [Por17].
4.1 Benign distance and weight sparsity
The strong trap code requires the existence of a family of quantum error-correcting codes with two
specific properties: a high benign distance, and weight sparsity. We specify these properties here.
If a QECC has distance d, it is not necessarily able to detect all Pauli errors of weight less
than d. For example, if one of the qubits in a codeword is in the state |0〉, then a Pauli-Z remains
undetected. In general, any Pauli error that stabilizes all codewords will remain undetected by the
code. Of course, such an error does not directly cause harm or adds noise to the state, because it
effectively performs the identity operation. However, in an adversarial setting, even such ‘benign’
Pauli errors indicate that someone tried to modify the state.
We consider an alternative distance measure for quantum error-correcting codes that describes
the lowest possible weight of a stabilizer:
Definition 10 (Benign distance). The benign distance of an [[n,m]] code is the minimum weight
of a non-identity Pauli P` such that P`|xL〉 = |xL〉 for all x ∈ {0, 1}m. If such P` does not exist,
the benign distance is ∞.
To distinguish the benign distance from the notion of difference defined in Definition 4, we will
often use the term conventional distance to refer to the latter.
The benign distance in a fixed relation to the conventional distance. For example, the [[7, 4]]
Steane code has distance 3, but benign distance 4. On the other hand, the [[49, 1]] concatenated
Steane code has distance 9, but a benign distance of only 4 (any non-identity stabilizer for the
[[7, 4]] Steane code is also a stabilizer on the [[49, 1]] code if it is concatenated with identity on
the other blocks). Even though the two quantities do not bound each other in general, we observe
that the benign distance of weakly self-dual CSS codes (i.e., CSS codes constructed from a weakly
self-dual classical code) grows with their conventional distance. See Lemma 15 in Appendix C.1.
We define a second property of interest: weight sparsity. Intuitively, weight sparsity means that
for any set of X-, Y-, and Z-weights, randomly selecting a Pauli operator with those weights only
yields a stabilizer with very small probability. This probability should shrink whenever the codeword
length grows; for this reason, we consider weight sparsity as a property of code families rather than
of individual codes.
Definition 11 (Weight-sparse code family). Let (Ei)i∈N be a family of quantum error-correcting
codes with parameters [[n(i),m(i), d(i)]]. For each i ∈ N, and for all non-negative integers x, y, z
such that x+y+z ≤ n(i), let Ai(x, y, z) denote the set of n(i)-qubit Paulis with X-weight x, Y-weight
y, and Z-weight z. Let Bi(x, y, z) denote set of benign Paulis in Ai(x, y, z).
The family (Ei)i∈N is weight-sparse if the function
f(i) := max
x+y+z≤n(i)
|Bi(x, y, z)|
|Ai(x, y, z)|
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is negligible6 in n(i).
In Appendix C, we construct a weight-sparse family of weakly self-dual CSS codes that have
benign distance O(
√
n(i)), where n(i) is the codeword length of the ith code in the family. The
CSS codes are constructed from a punctured version of classical Reed–Muller codes [Pre97].
4.2 The strong trap code
We present a modified version of the trap code, which we call the strong trap code. Contrary to the
regular trap code, which appends 2t trap qubits, the strong trap code only appends a single |0〉 trap
and a single |+〉 trap. These two traps are subsequently encoded using a quantum error-correcting
code that has the desired properties described above, resulting in a ciphertext of the same length
as the original trap code.
Definition 12 (Strong trap code). Let (Ei)i∈N be a weight-sparse family of weakly self-dual
CSS codes with parameters [[n(i), 1, d(i) = Ω(
√
n(i)]] and benign distance Ω(
√
n(i)). Then the
ith strong trap code {Vi,k}k∈Ki encodes m = 1 qubit using t = 3n(i) − 1 tags with the unitaries
Vi,k := pikE
⊗3
i H2n(i)+1 (where H2n(i)+1 = I
⊗2n(i) ⊗ H⊗ I⊗(n(i)−1)).
The strong trap code invokes two layers of security: the CSS codes Ei, which detect low-weight
attacks, and the traps |0〉 and |+〉, which detect higher-weight attacks by revealing bit and phase
flips, respectively.
One can verify that computing on quantum states authenticated with the strong trap code
works in much the same way as for the original trap code. For details, see [BGS13].7
Theorem 13. The strong trap code is a strong-purity-testing code with error negl(n(i)).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary i and non-identity Pauli P` ∈ P3n(i)\{I⊗3n(i)}. Let wx and wz denote
the X-weight and Z-weight (respectively) of P`, and note that max(wx, wz) > 0.
We bound the probability that P`′ := pi
†
kP`pik remains undetected by the code Ei and the
traps. Because Ei is a CSS code, it detects X and Z errors separately: let us write P`′ = PxPz
with Px ∈ {I,X}⊗3n(i) and Pz ∈ {I,Z}⊗3n(i), and focus first on the probability that Px remains
undetected, i.e., the probability that H2n(i)+1(E
†
i )
⊗3PxE⊗3i H2n(i)+1 ∈ P1 ⊗ {I,Z}⊗3n(i)−1.
Because of the permutation pik, Px is a random Pauli in {I,X}⊗3n(i) with weight wx. (Note that
Pz is also a random Pauli with weight wz, but is correlated with Px: any overlap in the locations
of X and Z operators in P` is preserved by the permutation.)
Consider all possible values of wx = w1 + w2 + w3, where w1 denotes the weight of Px on the
first (data) codeword, w2 the weight on the second (|0〉-trap) codeword, and w3 the weight on the
third (|+〉-trap) codeword:
– If wx = 0, then the Pauli Px is identity, and remains undetected with probability 1.
6 A function f(x) is negligible in x if for all c ∈ N, there exists an x0 such that for all x ≥ x0, f(x) < x−c. This
definition is extended by stating that a function f(x) is negligible in another function g(x) if for all c ∈ N, there
exists an x0 such that for all x ≥ x0, f(x) < (g(x))−c.
7 For some applications, authenticating through measurement (cf. [BGS13, Appendix B.2]) can be very useful. Our
underlying code has all the requirements to achieve this in principle, but in this work we focus on quantum
authentication and do not formulate the full security notions needed to properly describe this scenario.
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– If 0 < wx < d(i), then 0 < wj < d(i) for at least one j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Ei detects an error on the jth
block with certainty, since the weight of the error is below the distance and the benign distance.
– If d(i) ≤ wx ≤ 3n(i) − d(i), the attack Px will likely be detected on the second block, the
|0〉-trap. We can be in one of four cases:
• w2 > 0 and Px is detected in the second block by the CSS code Ei.
• w2 > 0 and Px acts as a logical operation on the second block. Since Px consists of only I’s
and X’s, this logical operation can only be an X by the construction of CSS codes. In this
case, Px is detected by the projection that checks whether the trap is still in the |0〉 state.
• w2 > 0 and Px acts as a stabilizer on the second block, and remains undetected on that
block. However, by the weight-sparsity of the code family, the probability that this is the
case is negligible in n(i).
• w2 = 0. In this case, Px acts as identity on the second block. The probability that this case
occurs, however, is small:
Pr
k
[w2 = 0] =
(
2n(i)
wx
)(
3n(i)
wx
) < (2
3
)wx
≤
(
2
3
)d(i)
. (15)
The first inequality holds in general for binomials, and the second one follows from the fact
that wx ≥ d(i). Since d(i) = Ω(
√
n(i)), this probability is negligible in n(i).
In total, the probability of the attack remaining undetected for d(i) ≤ wx ≤ 3n(i) − d(i) is
negligible in n(i).
– If 3n(i)− d(i) < wx < 3n(i): as in the second case, there is at least one j ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that
n(i)−d(i) < wj < n(i), causing the attack to be detected (recall that X⊗3n(i) is a logical X, and
therefore this mirrors the 0 < wx < d(i) case).
– If wx = 3n(i), then the logical content of the second block, the |0〉-trap, is flipped. This is
detected with certainty as well.
We see that unless wx = 0, the Pauli Px remains undetected only with probability negligible in n(i).
A similar analysis can be made for Pz: it is always detected with high probability, unless wz = 0.
We stress that these probabilities are not independent. However, we can say that
Pr
k
[Px and Pz undetected] ≤ min
{
Pr
k
[Px undetected], Pr
k
[Pz undetected]
}
, (16)
and since at least one of wx and wz is non-zero, this probability is negligible in n(i). uunionsq
5 Simultaneous encryptions with key reuse
Earlier work on key reuse for quantum authentication deals explicitly with key recycling, the decision
to reuse (part of) a key for a new encryption after completing the transmission of some other
quantum message. The key is reused only after the honest party decides whether to accept or
reject the first message, so recycling is a strictly sequential setting.
If Construction 1 is instantiated with a strong-purity-testing code (such as the strong trap
code), the resulting scheme is able to handle an even stronger, parallel, notion of key reuse. As long
as the one-time pads are independent, it is possible to encrypt multiple qubits under the same code
key while preserving security. Even if the adversary is allowed to interactively decrypt a portion
of the qubits one-by-one, the other qubits will remain authenticated. This property is especially
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important for the strong trap code: computing on data authenticated with the strong trap code
requires all qubits to be encrypted under the same permutation key.
The original trap code is secure in this setting (as long as the one-time pads are fresh; see
Section 5.2 of [BGS13]), but only if all qubits are decrypted at the same time. If some qubits
can be decrypted separately, the adversary can deduce the location of the |+〉 traps by applying
single-qubit X operations to different ciphertexts at different locations, and observing which ones
are rejected. Repeating this for the Z operator to learn about the |0〉 traps, the adversary can
completely break the authentication on the remaining qubits.
Suppose we encrypt two messages using an authentication scheme based on a strong-purity-
testing code {Vk0}K0 , using the same code key k0 but a fresh one-time pad. If we then decrypt the
first message, the scheme is still QCA-R-authenticating on the second message with only slightly
worse security.
Theorem 14 (informal). Let (Encrypt,Decrypt) be an ε-QCA-R-authenticating scheme resulting
from Construction 1, using a strong-purity-testing code {Vk0}K0. Let M1,M2 denote the plaintext
registers of the two messages, C1 = M1T1, C2 = M2T2 the corresponding ciphertext registers, and
R a side-information register. Let A1, A2 be arbitrary adversarial channels. Consider the setting
where the adversary acts on the qubits, encrypted with keys k0, k1, k2, as
DecryptC2→M2k0,k2 ◦ A
M1,C2,R
2 ◦ DecryptC1→M1k0,k1 ◦ A
C1,C2,R
1 ◦
(
EncryptM1→C1k0,k1 ⊗ Encrypt
M2→C2
k0,k2
)
,
so that the key k0 is used for both messages. Then, the scheme is 2ε-QCA-R-authenticating on the
second qubit.
Proof (Sketch). As a first step, we rewrite the encryption of the second qubit as using encoding
and teleportation, by using the equivalence between applying a random quantum one-time pad and
teleporting a state. The encryption of the second qubit can then be thought of as happening after
decryption of the first qubit. Next, we apply QCA-R security of the first qubit, where we are using
the property that k0 is recycled both in the accept and the reject case. Finally we undo the rewrite
and can directly apply QCA-R security on the remaining state. uunionsq
The full proof can be found in Appendix D. The argument easily extends to any polynomial number
of authenticated qubits.
6 Conclusion
We presented a new security definition, QCA-R, for ciphertext authentication with key recycling, and
showed that schemes based on purity-testing codes satisfy quantum ciphertext authentication, while
strong purity testing implies both ciphertext authentication and key recycling. This is analogous
to the security of quantum plaintext-authentication schemes from purity-testing codes [BCG+02,
Por17].
Additionally, we constructed the strong trap code, a variant of the trap code which is a strong-
purity-testing code and therefore is QCA-R secure (as well as secure under all notions of plaintext
authentication). This new scheme can strengthen security and add key-recycling to earlier appli-
cations of the trap code. It is also applicable in a wider range of applications than the original
trap code, because encrypted qubits remain secure even if other qubits sharing the same key are
decrypted earlier.
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A potential application of the strong trap code is the design of a quantum CCA2-secure en-
cryption scheme (as in [AGM17, Definition 9]) that allows for computation on the encrypted data.
By only using the pseudo-random generator for the one-time-pad keys, and recycling the key for
the underlying error-correcting code, this security level could be achieved.
As future work, our definition of QCA-R could be generalized in different ways. First, one
can consider a variant of the definition in the abstract-cryptography or universal-composability
framework, in order to ease the composition with other cryptographic primitives. Second, because
it can be useful to authenticate measurements in delegated-computation applications, one could
extend the definition of QCA-R to deal with the measurement of authenticated data. We expect no
real obstacles for this extension of the definition, and refer to [BGS13, Appendix B.2] for comparable
work on the original trap code.
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A Proof of Theorem 8
In this appendix, we work out the proof of Theorem 8. It follows the same strategy as the proof of
Theorem 9 in Section 3, but the expressions generally take on a nicer form.
Proof. Let A be an adversary as in Definition 3. Define a simulator S in the same way as in the proof
of Theorem 9. Note that this simulator is of the required form in the accept case (see Definition 3).
We show that for this simulator, the distance 12‖I−R‖ between the ideal and the real channel
is upper bounded by ε. Let ρMRE be any quantum state on the message register, side-information
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register, and an environment register E. Assume, as in the proof of Theorem 9, that A is a unitary
map UMTR. Let µrealk1,k2 and µ
ideal
k1,k2
be the effective attacks in the real and ideal world, respectively:
µrealk1,k2 := V
†
k1
P †k2U
MTRPMTk2 V
MT
k1
(ρ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|)V †k1P
†
k2
U †Pk2Vk1 , (17)
µidealk1,k2 := V
†
k1
P †k2U
M1TRPM1Tk2 V
M1T
k1
(ρ⊗ |0t,Φ+〉〈0t,Φ+|)V †k1P
†
k2
U †Pk2Vk1 . (18)
Then we can write the result of the real and the ideal channels as
R(ρ) = E
k1,k2
〈0t|Tµrealk1,k2 |0t〉 + |⊥〉〈⊥|M⊗ TrM
∑
i 6=0t
〈i|Tµrealk1,k2 |i〉
 , (19)
I(ρ) = E
k′1,k
′
2
〈Φ+, 0t|M1M2Tµidealk′1,k′2 |Φ+0t〉 + |⊥〉〈⊥|M⊗ TrM
 ∑
i 6=(Φ+,0t)
〈i|M1M2Tµidealk′1,k′2 |i〉
 . (20)
These expressions are obtained simply by plugging in the description of the authentication
scheme (see Construction 1) and the simulator into the channels of Definition 3. Since the accept
states are orthogonal to the reject states in the M register, the distance 12‖I(ρ) −R(ρ)‖tr can be
written as
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
(
〈Φ+, 0t|µidealk′1,k′2 |Φ
+, 0t〉
)
− E
k1,k2
〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
+
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
TrM ∑
i6=(0t,Φ+)
〈i|µidealk′1,k′2 |i〉
− E
k1,k2
TrM ∑
i 6=0t
〈i|µrealk1,k2 |i〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
. (21)
We can thus focus on bounding the two terms in equation (21), for accept and reject, separately.
Intuitively, the two states inside the first trace norm in equation (21) differ on those Paulis P` that
are accepted in the real scenario, but not in the ideal one. The strong-purity-testing property
promises that these Paulis are very few. We will work out this case; the second (the reject case) is
similar.
Decompose the attack as UMTR =
∑
` α`P
MT
` ⊗ UR` . Rewrite the real accept case as
E
k1,k2
〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉 (22)
= E
k1,k2
〈0t|V †k1P
†
k2
(∑
`
α`P
MT
` ⊗ UR`
)
PMTk2 V
MT
k1
(ρ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|)V †k1P
†
k2
(∑
`′
α∗`′P`′ ⊗ U †`′
)
Pk2Vk1 |0t〉
(23)
= E
k1,k2
∑
`,`′
α`α
∗
`′〈0t|
(
V †k1P
†
k2
P`Pk2Vk1 ⊗ UR`
)
(ρ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|)
(
V †k1P
†
k2
P`′Pk2Vk1 ⊗ U †`′
)
|0t〉. (24)
By the Pauli twirl [DCEL09] (or by commuting and resolving the symplectic product, as is done in
Appendix B.2), this last line equals
E
k1
∑
`
|α`|2 〈0t|
(
V †k1P`Vk1 ⊗ UR`
)
(ρ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|)
(
V †k1P`Vk1 ⊗ U
†
`
)
|0t〉 (25)
=E
k1
∑
`:V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal
|α`|2
(
QMk1,` ⊗ UR`
)
ρ
(
Qk1,` ⊗ U †`
)
, (26)
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where Qk1,` is the effective Pauli on the message register, induced by V
†
k1
P`Vk1 , and where Preal :=
Pm ⊗ {I,Z}⊗t is the set of (effective) Paulis that are undetected in the real scenario.
With the same techniques, we can rewrite the ideal accept case as
E
k′1,k
′
2
〈Φ+, 0t|µidealk′1,k′2 |Φ
+, 0t〉 = E
k′1
∑
`:V †
k′1
P`Vk1∈Pideal
|α`|2 (QMk1,` ⊗ UR` )ρ(QMk1,` ⊗ UR` ), (27)
where Pideal := {I⊗m} ⊗ {I,Z}⊗t is the set of Paulis that are undetected in the real scenario. Note
that for k1 and ` such that V
†
k1
P`Vk1 ∈ Pideal, Q`,k1 = I⊗m.
The distance between the ideal and the real accept states is thus
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
(
〈Φ+, 0t|µidealk′1,k′2 |Φ
+, 0t〉
)
− E
k1,k2
〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
(28)
=
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥Ek1
∑
`:V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal\Pideal
|α`|2 (QMk1,` ⊗ UR` )ρ(QMk1,` ⊗ UR` )
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
(29)
≤ 1
2Ek1
∑
`:V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal\Pideal
|α`|2 , (30)
by the triangle inequality for the trace norm. Let δ(Pa∈A) be 1 whenever Pa ∈ A, and 0 other-
wise. Note that for all k1, V
†
k1
P0Vk1 = I
⊗(m+t) 6∈ Preal\Pideal. This justifies the continuation of the
derivation:
=
1
2
∑
`
E
k1
δ
(V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal\Pideal)
|α`|2 (31)
=
1
2
∑
6`=0
E
k1
δ
(V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal\Pideal)
|α`|2 (32)
≤ 1
2
∑
6`=0
E
k1
δ
(V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal)
|α`|2 (33)
≤ 1
2
∑
6`=0
ε |α`|2 ≤ ε
2
. (34)
The first inequality is because Preal\Pideal ⊆ Preal, and the second inequality is by strong purity
testing of the code {Vk1}k1∈K1 . This concludes the proof that in the accept case, the real and the
ideal scenarios are ε-close (i.e., the first term of equation (21) is upper bounded by ε/2). The reject
case is completely analogous.
Summing the accept and reject case as in equation (21), we see that 12‖I(ρ) − R(ρ)‖tr≤ ε for
all ρ. This concludes the proof. uunionsq
B Details for the proof of Theorem 9
B.1 Derivation of equation (7)
We give details on how to arrive at equation (7) given the expressions for I and R in the proof of
Theorem 9.
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12
‖I(ρ)−R(ρ)‖tr (35)
=
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
[
〈Φ+, 0t|µidealk′1,k′2 |Φ
+, 0t〉 ⊗ τK
]
+ E
k′1,k
′
2
|⊥〉〈⊥|⊗ TrM
 ∑
i 6=(Φ+,0t)
〈i|µidealk′1,k′2 |i〉
⊗ τK1

− E
k1,k2
[〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉 ⊗ |k1k2〉〈k1k2|]− E
k1,k2
|⊥〉〈⊥|⊗ TrM
∑
i6=0t
〈i|µrealk1,k2 |i〉
⊗ |k1〉〈k1|
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
(36)
=
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
[
〈Φ+, 0t|µidealk′1,k′2 |Φ
+, 0t〉 ⊗ τK
]
− E
k1,k2
[〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉 ⊗ |k1k2〉〈k1k2|]
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
+
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
TrM
 ∑
i6=(Φ+,0t)
〈i|µidealk′1,k′2 |i〉
⊗ τK1
− E
k1,k2
TrM
∑
i6=0t
〈i|µrealk1,k2 |i〉
⊗ |k1〉〈k1|
∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
,
(37)
because ‖ρ+σ‖tr= ‖ρ‖tr+‖σ‖tr whenever ρ and σ are orthogonal (and the accept and reject states
are orthogonal in the M register), and because ‖|a〉〈a|⊗ρ‖tr = ‖ρ‖tr for basis states |a〉 (this allows
us to get rid of the |⊥〉〈⊥|).
Using the same techniques, and observing that the |k1k2〉〈k1k2| states (or |k1〉〈k1| in the case of
reject) are all orthogonal to each other, we obtain equation (7).
B.2 Derivation of equation (8)
We give details on how the equality in equation (8) is derived in the proof of Theorem 9.
E
k2
TrM ∑
i 6=0t
〈i|µrealk1,k2 |i〉
 (38)
=E
k2
(
TrM
∑
i6=0t
〈i|V †k1P
†
k2
(∑
`
α`P
MT
` ⊗ UR`
)
PMTk2 V
MT
k1
(ρMRE ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|T )
V †k1P
†
k2
(∑
`′
α∗`′P`′ ⊗ U †`′
)
Pk2Vk1 |i〉
)
(39)
=E
k2
(
TrM
∑
i6=0t
∑
`,`′
α`α
∗
`′〈i|
(
V †k1P
†
k2
PMT` P
MT
k2
V MTk1 ⊗ UR`
)
(ρMRE ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|T )
(
V †k1P
†
k2
P`′Pk2Vk1 ⊗ U †`′
)
|i〉
)
, (40)
where the second equality is obtained by moving summation signs further out and rearranging the
unitaries so that they are sorted according to the register they act on. Recall that the ` and `′
index an (m+ t)-qubit Pauli, and thus consist of 2(m+ t) bits: we can regard any such Pauli-index
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a as (xa, za) where the two parts are (m + t)-bit strings describing the locations of the X and Z
Paulis, respectively. Define the symplectic inner product (a, b)Sp := xa · zb − xb · za, which equals 1
whenever the Paulis Pa and Pb commute, and −1 when they anti-commute. Furthermore defining
⊕ as the bitwise xor operation, We can then continue the derivation as follows:
=E
k2
(
TrM
∑
i6=0t
∑
`,`′
α`α
∗
`′(−1)(`⊕`
′,k2)Sp〈i|
(
V †k1P`V
MT
k1
⊗ UR`
)
(ρMRE ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|T )
(
V †k1P`′Vk1 ⊗ U
†
`′
)
|i〉
)
(41)
= TrM
∑
i6=0t
∑
`
|α`|2 〈i|
(
V †k1P`V
MT
k1
⊗ UR`
)
(ρMRE ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|T )
(
V †k1P`Vk1 ⊗ U
†
`
)
|i〉. (42)
The last equality follows by Equality (2) in [Por17]. This permuting of Paulis and the cancellation
of terms for ` 6= `′ is also called the Pauli Twirl [DCEL09].
If we now apply the projector on the tag register T , and observe that the projection preserves
exactly those ` such that V †k1P`Vk1 6∈ Preal (i.e., those P` that are rejected), the right-hand side of
equation (8) is obtained.
B.3 Derivation of equation (14)
We give details on how to obtain equation (14), which bounds the difference between the accept
and reject case in the real scenario.
For this derivation, it will be useful to purify ρMRE as
∑
i βi|ψi〉MREE
′
, where E′ is an extra
environment register for the purification. Note that 〈ψi|ψj〉 = 0 for i 6= j.
With the same strategy as in Appendix B.2, except for the last step, we can rewrite the real
state as
〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉 (43)
= 〈0t|V †k1P
†
k2
(∑
`
α`P
MT
` ⊗ UR`
)
PMTk2 V
MT
k1
∑
i,i′
βiβ
∗
i′ |ψi〉〈ψi′ | ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|T

V †k1P
†
k2
(∑
`′
α∗`′P`′ ⊗ U †`′
)
Pk2Vk1 |0t〉 (44)
=
∑
i,i′
∑
`,`′
βiα`β
∗
i′α
∗
`′〈0t|
(
V †k1P
†
k2
P`Pk2V
MT
k1
⊗ UR`
)
|ψi〉|0t〉〈ψi′ |〈0t|
(
V †k1P
†
k2
P`′Pk2Vk1 ⊗ U †`′
)
|0t〉
(45)
=
∑
i,i′
∑
`,`′
βiα`β
∗
i′α
∗
`′(−1)(`,k2)Sp(−1)(`
′,k2)Sp
〈0t|
(
V †k1P`V
MT
k1
⊗ UR`
)
|ψi〉|0t〉〈ψi′ |〈0t|
(
V †k1P`′Vk1 ⊗ U
†
`′
)
|0t〉, (46)
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which, as a real state, can be expressed as∑
i
∑
`
βiα`(−1)(`,k2)Sp〈0t|
(
V †k1P`V
MT
k1
⊗ UR`
)
|ψi〉|0t〉 (47)
=
∑
`:V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal
α`(−1)(`,k2)Sp(QMk1,` ⊗ UR` )
∑
i
βi|ψi〉, (48)
where Qk1,` is the Pauli on the message register M that results from V
†
k1
P`Vk1 ∈ Preal = Pm⊗{I,Z}⊗t.
In much the same way, but using Equality (2) in [Por17] as we did in Appendix B.2, we can write
the accept state in the ideal scenario,
E
k′1,k
′
2
(
〈Φ+, 0t|µidealk′1,k′2 |Φ
+, 0t〉
)
, (49)
as the pure state
E
k′1
 ∑
`:V †
k′1
P`Vk′1
∈Pideal
α`U
R
`
∑
i
βi|ψi〉
 (50)
=
∑
`
E
k′1
δ
(V †
k′1
P`Vk′1
∈Pideal)α`U
R
`
∑
i
βi|ψi〉, (51)
where δ
(V †
k′1
P`Vk′1
∈Pideal) is the indicator function that is equal to 1 whenever V
†
k′1
P`Vk′1 ∈ Pideal, and 0
otherwise. Continuing, we rewrite the ideal accept state as
= α0U
R
0
∑
i
βi|ψi〉 +
∑
` 6=0
E
k′1
δ
(V †
k′1
P`Vk′1
∈Pideal)α`U
R
`
∑
i
βi|ψi〉. (52)
(Recall that P0 = I
⊗(m+t) by convention.) By the strong-purity-testing property of the code
{Vk1}k1∈K1 , and the fact that Pideal ⊆ Preal, the second term in equation (52) has very small ampli-
tude. Thus, the ideal accept state is ε-close in trace distance to α0U
R
0
∑
i βi|ψi〉.
We are now ready to bound the expected distance between the ideal and the real case:
E
k1,k2
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
(
〈Φ+, 0t|µidealk′1,k′2 |Φ
+, 0t〉
)
− 〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
(53)
≤ ε
2
+ E
k1,k2
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ |α0|2∑
i,i′
βiβi′U0|ψi〉〈ψi′ |U †0 −
 ∑
`:V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal
α`(−1)(`,k2)Sp(Qk1,` ⊗ U`)
∑
i
βi|ψi〉

 ∑
`′:V †k1P`′Vk1∈Preal
α`′(−1)(`′,k2)Sp
∑
i
βi〈ψi|(Qk1,`′ ⊗ U †`′)
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
(54)
≤ ε
2
+ E
k1,k2
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥α0U0
∑
i
βi|ψi〉 −
 ∑
`:V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal
α`(−1)(`,k2)Sp(Qk1,` ⊗ U`)
∑
i
βi|ψi〉

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ . (55)
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The first inequality is the triangle inequality, and the second one follows from Lemma C.2 in [Por17],
which states that 12‖|φ〉〈φ|−|ψ〉〈ψ|‖tr ≤ ‖|φ〉 − |ψ〉‖ (where the latter is the vector 2-norm, i.e.,
‖|φ〉‖:= √〈φ|φ〉).
Continuing,
=
ε
2
+ E
k1,k2
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i
βi
∑
` 6=0:V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal
α`(−1)(`,k2)Sp(Qk1,` ⊗ U`)|ψi〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ (56)
=
ε
2
+ E
k1,k2
√√√√∑
i,i′
β∗i βi′
∑
` 6=0:V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal
∑
`′ 6=0:V †k1P`′Vk1∈Preal
α∗`α`′(−1)(`⊕`′,k2)Sp〈ψi|(Qk1,` ⊗ U †` )(Qk1,`′ ⊗ U`)|ψi′〉
(57)
≤ ε
2
+
√√√√ E
k1,k2
∑
i,i′
β∗i βi′
∑
` 6=0:V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal
∑
`′ 6=0:V †k1P`′Vk1∈Preal
α∗`α`′(−1)(`⊕`′,k2)Sp〈ψi|(Qk1,` ⊗ U †` )(Qk1,`′ ⊗ U`)|ψi′〉
(58)
=
ε
2
+
√√√√E
k1
∑
i,i′
β∗i βi′
∑
` 6=0:V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal
|α`|2 〈ψi|(Qk1,` ⊗ U †` )(Qk1,` ⊗ U`)|ψi′〉, (59)
by Jensen’s inequality and by Equation (2) in [Por17]. This last line we can simplify greatly to
=
ε
2
+
√√√√E
k1
∑
i
|βi|2
∑
6`=0:V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal
|α`|2 〈ψi|ψi〉 (60)
=
ε
2
+
√√√√E
k1
∑
` 6=0:V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal
|α`|2 (61)
=
ε
2
+
√∑
6`=0
E
k1
δ
(V †k1P`Vk1∈Preal)
|α`|2 (62)
≤ ε
2
+
√∑
6`=0
ε |α`| ≤ ε
2
+
√
ε. (63)
The inequality is again due to the strong-purity-testing property of the code {Vk1}K1 . This concludes
the derivation of equation (14).
C A high-benign-distance, weight-sparse code family
In this appendix, we construct a family of quantum error-correcting codes that has the properties
required for the construction of the strong trap code. The family will consist of weakly self-dual
CSS codes that are based on classical Reed–Muller codes. Before we give the construction of the
code family itself, we prove useful lemmas about the benign distance and weight sparsity of CSS
codes.
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C.1 Benign distance of CSS codes
This first lemma shows that if a (weakly self-dual) CSS code has high distance, then also its benign
distance must be high.
Lemma 15. Let C1 an C2 be two classical linear codes such that C2 ⊂ C1 and C⊥1 = C2. Then the
benign distance of CSS(C1, C2) is greater than or equal to its conventional distance.
Proof. Let d denote the distance of the classical code C1. By the construction of CSS codes,
CSS(C1, C2) also has (conventional) distance d.
Also by construction, the check matrix of CSS(C1, C2) is given by[
H(C⊥2 ) 0
0 H(C1)
]
=
[
G(C2) 0
0 G(C2)
]
, (64)
where H(·) represents the parity check matrix of a classical code, and G(·) the generator matrix.
The rows of G(C2) form a basis for the codewords in C2. Since C1 has distance d, and C2 ⊂ C1,
any row in G(C2), and any linear combination of these rows, has weight at least d. Thus, any linear
combination of rows in the above check matrix also has weight at least d.
The rows of the check matrix generate the stabilizers of the code [NC00]. We may conclude
that the stabilizers of the code CSS(C1, C2) all have weight at least d, and therefore the benign
distance of the code is at least d. uunionsq
We now further specify our construction: if the CSS code is built from a so-called punctured
classical code, then its distance (and therefore benign distance) is high.
Lemma 16. Let C be an [n,m, d] self-dual linear code for some d > 1. Assume w.l.o.g.8 that not
all codewords in C end in 0. Define
C1 := {c ∈ {0, 1}n−1 | c0 ∈ C ∨ c1 ∈ C}
and C2 := C
⊥
1 . Then CSS(C1, C2) is an [[n − 1, 1, d′]] code with d′ ∈ {d − 1, d} and with benign
distance db ≥ d′ ≥ d− 1.
Proof. The code C1 is a [n − 1,m, d′] code for some d′ ∈ {d − 1, d}. Firstly, it has length n − 1,
because one bit is removed (punctured) from the codewords of C. Secondly, it has rank m: there
are no two codewords in C that differ at only the punctured bit (since d > 1), and so the punctured
versions of two distinct codewords are also distinct. Thirdly, it has distance d − 1, again because
one bit is removed from the codewords in C which all had weight at least d.
In order to prove the statement of the lemma, we need to show two things: firstly, that C2 has
rank m − 1 (from which the parameters of the CSS code will follow), and secondly, that C2 ⊂ C1
(from which db ≥ d′ will follow by Lemma 15, and which shows that C1 and C2 are valid candidates
for the CSS construction).
We start by showing a stronger version of the second claim, namely that C2 = {c2 | c20 ∈ C}.
The latter set is then clearly a subset of C1. For the forward inclusion, pick an arbitrary c2 ∈ C2.
For all c ∈ C, which by definition of C1 we can write as c = c1b for c1 ∈ C1 and b ∈ {0, 1}, it follows
that 〈c20, c〉 = 〈c20, c1b〉 = 〈c2, c1〉 + 0 = 0. The last equality follows from the fact that C2 = C⊥1 .
8 If they do, pick a different position to puncture at. Since d 6= 0, such a position always exists.
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And so, c20 ∈ C⊥ = C (as C is self-dual). For the other inclusion, pick a c2 ∈ {c2 | c20 ∈ C}. To
show that c2 ∈ C2 = C⊥1 , we show that 〈c1, c2〉 = 0 for all c1 ∈ C1: let c1 ∈ C1, and note that by
definition, there is a b ∈ {0, 1} such that c1b ∈ C. Then 〈c1, c2〉 = 〈c1b, c20〉 = 0, as C is self-dual.
It remains to show that |C2|= 12 |C1|, i.e., C2 has rank m − 1. For this, the stronger statement
C2 = {c | c0 ∈ C} proven above will be useful. To see that |{c | c0 ∈ C}|= 12 |C1|, consider a basis
{v1, ..., vm} for C, and let I ⊂ [m] be the set of indices i such that (vi)n = 1 (recall that we assumed
without loss of generality that I 6= ∅). Note that all x ∈ {0, 1}m represent a (unique) codeword
c = x1v1 + x2v2 + · · ·+ xmvm of C, and conversely every codeword in C is represented by some x.
write every c ∈ C as x1v1 +x2v2 + · · ·xmvm for some x ∈ {0, 1}m. Since I is non-empty, exactly half
of all x ∈ {0, 1}m have ∑i∈I xi = 0 mod 2 (resulting in the nth bit of c being 0), and exactly half
have
∑
i∈I xi = 1 mod 2 (resulting in the nth bit of c being 1). Thus, exactly half of the elements
in C are of the form a0 for some a ∈ {0, 1}n−1. Since d > 1, and so distinct codewords in C are
punctured to distinct codewords in C1, the statement |{c | c0 ∈ C}|= 12 |C1| follows.
We may conclude that the rank of C2 is m− 1. Thus, CSS(C1, C2) is an [[n− 1, 1, d′]] code for
d′ ∈ {d− 1, d}. uunionsq
C.2 Weight sparsity of CSS codes
As it turns out, for CSS code families it suffices to show that the family is X-weight sparse, as
illustrated by the definition and lemma below.
Definition 17 (X-weight-sparse code family). Let (Ei)i∈N be a family of quantum error-correction
codes with parameters [[n(i),m(i), d(i)]], and define the sets Ai(x, y, z) and Bi(x, y, z) as in defini-
tion 11. Moreover, define AXi (x) := Ai(x, 0, 0) and B
X
i (x) := Bi(x, 0, 0).
The family (Ei)i∈N is X-weight sparse if the function
fX(i) := max
w≤n(i)
|BXi (w)|
|AXi (w)|
is negligible in n(i).
Note that for weakly self-dual CSS codes, X-weight sparsity immediately implies Z-weight spar-
sity (defined analogously), as weakly self-dual CSS codes are symmetric in their X and Z stabilizers.
It also implies general weight sparsity:
Lemma 18. If the codes in the family (Ei)i∈N are all CSS codes, and the family is X-weight sparse,
then the family is also weight sparse.
Proof. Recall from the proof of Lemma 15 that a CSS code has a stabilizer generating set containing
elements that are built up of either exclusively X and I (we will call these X-stabilizers), or exclusively
Z and I (which we will call Z-stabilizers). Thus, any stabilizer P` for the CSS code can be written
as a product P`xP`z of an X-stabilizer P`x and a Z-stabilizer P`z .
Consider a code Ei in the family, and arbitrary nonnegative integers x, y, z such that x+y+z ≤
n(i). Then elements of Ai(x, y, z) can be constructed by first selecting a Pauli P`x of the appropriate
weight, and then selecting a Pauli P`z of the appropriate weight and overlapping with P`x at an
appropriate number of positions:
Ai(x, y, z) = {P`xP`z | P`x ∈ AXi (x+ y) and P`z ∈ AZi (y + z | P`x , y)}, (65)
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where AZi (y + z | P`x , y) denotes the subset of Ai(0, 0, x + y) that overlap with P`x on exactly y
positions. Note that for all P`x ∈ AXi (x+ y),
|AZi (y + z | P`x , y)|= |AZi (y + z | P`0 , y)|, (66)
for the canonical P`0 := X
⊗(x+y)I⊗(n(i)−x−y). Hence,
|Ai(x, y, z)|= |AXi (x+ y)|·|AZi (y + z | P`0 , y)|. (67)
Similarly, define BZi (y + z | P`x , y) to be the benign subset of AZi (y + z | P`x , y). Using the same
reasoning as above, we can arrive at the inequality
|Bi(x, y, z)|= |BXi (x+ y)|·|BZi (y + z | P`0 , y)|≤ |BXi (x+ y)|·|AZi (y + z | P`0 , y)|. (68)
Combining the above results, we conclude that for all nonnegative integers x, y, and z such that
x+ y + z ≤ n(i),
|Bi(x, y, z)|
|Ai(x, y, z)| ≤
|BXi (x+ y)|·|AZi (y + z | P`0 , y)|
|AXi (x+ y)|·|AZi (y + z | P`0 , y)|
=
|BXi (x+ y)|
|AXi (x+ y)|
. (69)
Maximizing over x, y, z on both sides of the inequality, and noting that x+ y ≤ n(i), the statement
of the lemma follows. uunionsq
C.3 A high-benign-distance, weight-sparse QECC family
In this subsection, we construct a family of quantum error-correcting codes that is based on classical
Reed–Muller codes [Sho96, Pre97]. We show that it has distance and benign distance O(
√
n(i)),
where n(i) is the codeword length of the ith code in the family, and that it is weight sparse.
Reed–Muller codes are a class of codes based on polynomials on the field Fa2 for some a ∈ N.
Every polynomial on the field is associated with a vector of length 2a, representing the values of
that polynomial on every possible input. The Reed–Muller code R(i, a) consists of all these vectors
for polynomials of degree up to i. Increasing i while keeping a constant results in a higher-ranked
code, but with a smaller distance. For a discussion, see [Pre97], Chapter 7.
For our purposes, we will be interested in Reed–Muller codes where a scales with i as a = 2i+1
(for i ∈ N), as these codes happen to be self-dual. They have codeword length 22i+1, rank 22i,
and distance 2i+1 [Pre97]. Instantiating the construction in Lemma 16 with R(i, 2i + 1), we see
that the resulting quantum code Ri is an [[n(i),m(i), d(i)]] code with n(i) = 2
2i+1 − 1, m(i) = 1,
and d(i) =
√
22(i+1) − 1. In the resulting family (Ri)i∈N, the codeword length grows approximately
quadratically with the desired distance (since n(i) = 12(d(i) + 1)
2 + 1). The benign distance is also
high, at least d(i)− 1.
Lemma 19. The family (Ri)i∈N of quantum error-correction codes, where Ri is constructed by
puncturing the self-dual Reed–Muller code R(i, 2i+ 1), is weight sparse.
Proof. Since all the codes Ri are CSS codes, by Lemma 18 we only need to show that the family is
X-weight sparse, i.e.,
max
w≤n(i)
BXi (w)
AXi (w)
(70)
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is negligible in n(i). Recall from Lemma 18 that AXi (w) refers to the set of Paulis consisting of w
Pauli-Xs and n(i)− w identity operations, in any order. BXi is the benign subset of AXi .
The quantity AXi (w) can be expressed as
(
n(i)
w
)
. By construction of Ri, all its X-stabilizers are
generated by the generators of Ci,2, the dual of the punctured version of the classical Reed–Muller
code R(i, 2i+ 1) (see also the proof of Lemma 15). Hence, the quantity BXi (w) is equal to |Ci,2(w)|,
the number of codewords in Ci,2 of weight w. This in turn is upper bounded by |Ci,1(w)|, where
Ci,1 is the punctured Reed–Muller code. (Ci,2 is the even subcode of Ci,1.) Since 1
n(i) 6∈ Ci,2 and so
|Ci,2(n(i))|= 0, it suffices to show that
max
w≤n(i)−1
|Ci,1(w)|(
n(i)
w
) (71)
is negligible in n(i).
First, note that since 1n(i) ∈ Ci,1, and so for every string s ∈ Ci,1 also 1n(i) ⊕ s ∈ Ci,1, there are
an equal amount of strings with weight w in the code as with weight n(i)−w. Therefore, it suffices
to consider only those w ∈ {1, . . . , (n(i)− 1)/2}. We find an upper bound to the above expression,
for three separate cases:
0 < w < d(i): The bound follows directly from the error-correcting property of the code: there is
no codeword in Ci,1 with weight less than the distance d(i). Hence, |Ci,1(w)|/
(
n(i)
w
) ≤ 0 for these
values of w.
d ≤ w < n(i)8 : For this case, we can use a theorem on intersecting sets by Ray-Chaudhuri and
Wilson [RCW75]. Consider two (non-identical) strings s, t ∈ Ci,1 with |s|= |t|= w. Then, since
Ci,1 is a linear code, if we define u = s ⊕ t, we have that also u ∈ Ci,1. In particular, |u|≥ d.
Now write |u|= |s|+|t|−2|s ∧ t|≥ d(i), and therefore we have
|s ∧ t|≤ 1
2
(|s|+|t|−d(i)) = w − d(i)
2
. (72)
Now, instead of bitstrings, we view all strings in Ci,1 of weight w as a family Fw of subsets of
[n(i)]. To be more precise, define Fw = {{j : j ∈ [n(i)], sj = 1} : s ∈ Ci,1(w)}. We will bound
the size of this set family, noting that |Fw|= |Ci,1(w)|. From the previous argument, we have
∀F,G ∈ Fw, F 6= G : |F ∩G|≤ w − d(i)2 .
From the Ray-Chaudhuri–Wilson inequality, stated in Lemma 20, it then immediately follows
that
|Fw|≤
(
n(i)
w − d(i)2
)
. (73)
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Now, to bound the ratio of this bound to the total number of strings of weight w.
|Fw|(
n(i)
w
) ≤
( n(i)
w− d(i)
2
)
(
n(i)
w
) (74)
=
w! (n(i)− w)!
(w − d(i)2 )! (n(i)− w + d(i)2 )!
(75)
=
w
d(i)
2
(n(i)− w + d(i)2 )
d(i)
2
(76)
≤
(
n(i)
8
) d(i)
2
(
7n(i)
8
) d(i)
2
≤
(
1
7
) d(i)
2
. (77)
Here mk is the falling factorial.9 The second-to-last inequality is by filling in the worst case
for w (and dropping the additional d(i)/2 in the denominator). The final inequality follows by
suitably grouping terms in the falling factorial and noting that x−ky−k ≤ xy for all 0 ≤ x ≤ y and
0 ≤ k < y.
Since for the Reed–Muller code the distance d(i) is Ω(
√
n(i)), this bound is negligible in n(i).
n(i)
8 ≤ w ≤ n(i)−12 : For these weights we will compare the total number of elements of Ci,1 with(
n(i)
w
)
, and show that
|Ci,1|
(n(i)w )
= negl(n(i)).
Let h(p) = −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p) be the binary entropy function. The total number of
elements of Ci,1 is 2
22i = 2
1
2
(n(i)+1). Without loss of generality, assume we look at w = n(i)8 , since
the quantity we are computing,
|Ci,1|
(n(i)w )
, is monotonically decreasing for all w in the range we are
considering.
As a rough bound, for our case of α = 18 , we can use that
(
n(i)
αn(i)
) ≥ 1
O(
√
n(i))
2h(α)n(i). (This bound
follows from applying Stirling’s approximation to the factorial formula for binomial coefficients.)
Note that h(1/8) ≈ 0.54 > 12 , and therefore the ratio is upper bounded by a function that is
negligible in n(i).
Combining the cases in the above analysis, we see that the maximum of BXi (w)/A
X
i (w) over all
w ≤ n(i) is upper bounded by the maximum of two negligible functions, which is itself negligible
in n(i). uunionsq
Lemma 20 (Ray-Chaudhuri–Wilson inequality [RCW75]). If F is a family of k-uniform
L-intersecting subsets of a set of n elements, where |L| = s, then,
|F| ≤
(
n
s
)
.
Here L = {l1, ..., ls} is a collection of allowed intersection sizes. Then, L-intersecting means that
for all i 6= j, the intersection size |Fi ∩ Fj | ∈ L.
9 i.e. mk = m(m− 1) · · · (m− k + 1).
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D Proof of Theorem 14
We will state and prove security under parallel encryptions and sequential decryptions, in a setting
that we described in Section 5.
As a shorthand, define Projacc and Projrej as the quantum operations induced by projecting
on, respectively, the accepting and rejecting outcomes of the decryption procedure. That is, the
accept/reject projectors on a message register M are defined as
ProjMacc : ρ→
(
IM − |⊥〉〈⊥|M
)
ρ
(
IM − |⊥〉〈⊥|M
)†
and
ProjMrej : ρ→ |⊥〉〈⊥|Mρ
(
|⊥〉〈⊥|M
)†
.
The full statement of the theorem then is as follows.
Theorem 14 (formal statement). Let (Encrypt,Decrypt) be an ε-QCA-R-authenticating scheme
resulting from Construction 1, using a strong-purity-testing code {Vk0}K0. Let M1,M2 denote the
plaintext registers of the two messages, C1 = M1T1, C2 = M2T2 the corresponding ciphertext reg-
isters, and R a side-information register. Let A1, A2 be arbitrary adversarial channels. Define the
effective real channel, for keys k0, k1, k2, as
Realk0,k1,k2 = Decrypt
C2→M2
k0,k2
◦AM1,C2,R2 ◦DecryptC1→M1k0,k1 ◦A
C1,C2,R
1 ◦
(
EncryptM1→C1k0,k1 ⊗ Encrypt
M2→C2
k0,k2
)
.
There exist a simulator Srej such that the key-recycling real channel
R : ρM1M2R 7→ Ek0,k1,k2
[(
ProjM2acc ◦ Realk0,k1,k2(ρ)
)
⊗ |k0, k2〉〈k0, k2|
+
(
ProjM2rej ◦ Realk0,k1,k2(ρ)
)
⊗ |k0〉〈k0|
]
(78)
is 2ε-close in diamond-norm distance to the ideal channel,
I : IM2 ⊗ Sacc ⊗ Ek0,k2 [|k0, k2〉〈k0, k2|] + |⊥〉〈⊥|M2TrM2 ⊗ Srej ⊗ Ek0 [|k0〉〈k0|] . (79)
Here, Sacc is as in Definition 7, and Projacc and Projacc are the quantum operations induced by
projecting on the accepting and rejecting outcomes of the decryption procedure of the second qubit.
Proof. We can represent the starting real channel pictorially as follows. The ‘key reveal box’ at the
end corresponds to the key-recycling term in the real channel, the content of which depends on
whether the scheme accepts or rejects.
R:
Encryptk0,k1
Encryptk0,k2
Decryptk0,k1
Decryptk0,k2A1
M1 C1
M2 C2
C1 M1
C2 M2
R R R
A2
acc: reveal k0, k2
rej : reveal k0
K
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First, note that the one-time pad key k1 is picked completely at random, used only for the
encryption and decryption of the first qubit. In particular, in the final situation as represented by
R we do not require key-recycling for k1.
We can view applying a quantum-one time pad that uses a uniformly-random key as completely
equivalent to performing a teleportation. Therefore our real channel is the same, whether this key
k2 is picked randomly beforehand, or is the random outcome kˆ2 of a teleportation measurement.
We denote the channel where the key of the second qubit comes from teleportation by R2. Because
this rewriting doesn’t change functionality, we have that ‖R2 −R‖ = 0.
We depict the channel R2 pictorially below, which is the easiest representation. For completeness
we will also write out the channel symbolically.
Let ΓEC2→Kˆ2 be the quantum channel that performs a pairwise Bell measurement between the
n qubits in register E and the n qubits in C2, and stores the 2n classical outcome bits as Kˆ2. That
is, if we define
|Φk〉EC2 =
(
n⊗
i=1
Xki
)E ( 2n⊗
i=n+1
Zki
)E n⊗
i=1
|Φ+〉(E)i(C2)i (80)
to be the basis of all possible n-qubit Bell states between pairwise qubits of E and C2, the mea-
surement channel is defined by the operation
ΓEC2→Kˆ2(ρ) =
∑
kˆ
|kˆ〉〈kˆ|〈Φkˆ|EC2ρEC2 |Φkˆ〉EC2 . (81)
Define the shorthand:
Real′M1M2R→M2RKˆ2k0,k1 =Decrypt
C2→M2
k0,Kˆ2 ◦ A
M1,C2,R
2 ◦ DecryptC1→M1k0,k1
◦
(
AC1,D,R1 ⊗ ΓEC2→Kˆ2
)
◦
(
EncryptM1→C1k0,k1 ⊗ Encrypt
M2→C2
k0,0
⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|DE
)
,
where we slightly abuse notation in letting the final Decrypt use a copy of the contents of the Kˆ2
register as a key. The rewritten channel becomes
R2 : ρ
M1M2R 7→ Ek0,k1
[ (
ProjM2acc ◦ Real′M1M2R→M2RKˆ2k0,k1 (ρ)
)
⊗ |k0〉〈k0|
+
(
TrKˆ2Proj
M2
rej ◦ Real′M1M2R→M2RKˆ2k0,k1 (ρ)
)
⊗ |k0〉〈k0|
]
. (82)
(In the accept branch, the Kˆ2 register is output as part of the recycled key.)
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R2:
Encryptk0,k1
Encryptk0,0
Decryptk0,k1
Decryptk0,kˆ2A1
Φ+
D(∼ C2)
E(∼ C2)
C2
M2
M1 C1
C2
C1 M1
M2
R R R
A2
B
el
l
M
ea
s.
kˆ2
acc: reveal k0, kˆ2
rej : reveal k0
K
Our next step will be to apply the QCA-R security of qubit 1. Note that we can shift the
encryption of qubit 2, and the Bell measurement afterwards, to occur after qubit 1 is decrypted.
This is possible since none of the registers M2, E, Kˆ2 are used by A1 in the channel R2.
Now we view R2 as a real channel for qubit 1, composed with some other quantum channel
that uses k0. (Again, we will write the components of channel out, but the transformation will be
clearest by looking at the diagram.)
We define S as the real channel (as in the definition of QCA-R) of adversary A1 acting on qubit
1. That is,
SM1DR→M1RK0K1 : ρ→ E
k0,k1
[ (
ProjM1acc ⊗ DecryptM1→C1k0,k1 ◦ A
C1,D,R
1 ◦ EncryptM1→C1k0,k1
)
(ρ)⊗ |k0, k1〉〈k0, k1|
+
(
ProjM1rej ⊗ DecryptM1→C1k0,k1 ◦ A
C1,D,R
1 ◦ EncryptM1→C1k0,k1
)
(ρ)⊗ |k0〉〈k0|
]
.
(83)
Then by security of the scheme, we know that there exists a simulator SD,R1 = S1acc +S1rej such that
the corresponding ideal channel T is ε close to the real channel in the diamond-norm. The ideal
channel is given by
TM1DR→M1RK0K1 : ρ→ (IM1 ⊗ S1acc) (ρ⊗ Ek0,k1 [|k0, k1〉〈k0, k1|])
+
(|⊥〉〈⊥|M1TrM1 ⊗ S1rej) (ρ⊗ Ek0 [|k0〉〈k0|]) . (84)
Now we note that it’s possible to construct a quantum operation UK0 so that we can write R2(ρ)
as
UK0 ◦ (TrK1SM1DR ⊗ IE,C2)(ρM1,M2,R ⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|DE) . (85)
First the part of the key corresponding to k1, which is only recycled in the accept case, is traced
out. The operation UK0 corresponds to everything happening after decryption of the first qubit:
Use the recycled key k0, which is output by S, to encode the second qubit, and then perform the
teleportation step as before. The operation ends by executing A2, decrypting, and recycling keys
as required.
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We construct the next channel R3(ρ) by replacing the qubit-one real channel S in this formu-
lation by the ideal channel T. That is, the channel becomes
UK0 ◦ (TrK1TM1DR ⊗ IE,C2)(ρM1,M2,R ⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|DE) . (86)
The diamond-norm distance is constant under tensor product with the identity channel. The dis-
tance between any two channels is also monotonely non-increasing when applying a quantum oper-
ation afterwards, or when fixing a part of the input beforehand. Therefore, because QCA-R security
of the scheme implies 12‖S− T‖ ≤ ε, we have that 12‖R3 −R2‖ ≤ ε.
R3:
Encryptk0,0
Decryptk0,kˆ2
S1
Φ+
D(∼ C2)
E(∼ C2)
C2
M2
M1
C2 M2
R R R
A2
B
el
l
M
ea
s.
kˆ2
|⊥〉
acc: reveal k0, kˆ2
rej : reveal k0
K
The dotted box in the picture represents the conditional replacement of M1 by the state |⊥〉〈⊥|, in
the reject case of the simulator S1.
We have applied the security definition on the first qubit and effectively gotten rid of prior
dependence of key k0. Now, we can undo the teleportation rewrite and encrypt the second qubit at
the start again. Represent this rewrite as R4. Because the functionality is equivalent, we have that
1
2‖R3 −R4‖ = 0.
R4: Encryptk0,k2
M2 C2 Decryptk0,kˆ2
S1
M1
C2 M2
R R R
A2
acc: reveal k0, k2
rej : reveal k0
K
|⊥〉
Finally we can apply the QCA-R security again, for the channel depicted as R4, with A′2 =
A2 ◦ (IM1 ⊗S1acc + |⊥〉〈⊥|M1TrM1 ⊗S1rej) playing the role of the adversary in the security definition.
It directly follows that 12‖I−R4‖ ≤ ε, i.e., the diamond-norm distance between R4 and our aimed
ideal channel I is at most ε. Also recall that 12‖R4−R‖ ≤ ε. Therefore, by triangle inequality, the
original real channel R is at most 2ε from the ideal channel I. uunionsq
32
